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T
he UN Millennium Development Goals address many dimensions of extreme
poverty – including penury, hunger, disease, analfabetism and inadequate housing –
while promoting gender equality and environmental sustainability. Poverty reduction
is the result of several interacting factors, including importantly: redistribution of
incomes, assets, and opportunities; pro-poor economic growth; and social provision and
protection. This issue of IPC’s journal Poverty in Focus highlights the importance of social
protection in the struggle against global poverty. Inequality reduction and pro-poor
growth will be the theme of the next issue.
Social protection aims to enhance the capacity of poor and vulnerable persons to manage
economic and social risks, such as unemployment, exclusion, sickness, disability and old
age. Policy interventions can improve their well-being by, among other things, moderating
the impact of shocks causing sharp reductions in their income or consumption. Social
protection and provision can also enhance the productive capabilities of poor men and
women, reducing poverty and inequality and stimulating pro-poor growth.
Like other policy areas, social policies involve choices and priorities, for example between
mere social safety nets and promotion of sustainable livelihoods, short term alleviation
and long-term elimination of poverty, universal and targeted programmes, conditional
and unconditional schemes, food and cash transfers, etc. Criteria must be set for selecting
which households, and who within them, should receive the benefits. If schemes are
conditional, then on what: participation in education, health, nutrition and/or work
programmes? Is such participation by the poor and needy in fact constrained by
demand or supply factors? Can institutional and management capacity cope effectively?
These are some of the issues policy planners need to consider, and this Poverty in Focus
journal covers many of them. The first article discusses the basic social policy choice of
targeting vs. universalism, i.e. whether social benefits are a basic right for all citizens or
only for the truly needy and deserving. Policy regimes are usually somewhere between
these two extremes, but where they lie on this continuum can be decisive in spelling
out individuals’ life chances and in characterizing the social order.
Then, a broad view of social protection for the poorest is presented, which envisages
social protection as having both short- and long-term roles in poverty reduction;
several illustrative project and programme examples are presented and then
highlighted in text boxes throughout the journal in their regional context.
In South Africa, a proposal for a universal income grant has engendered an intense debate.
The implications of such a scheme are analysed in the following article, including both
poverty reduction outcomes and the macro-economic feasibility. This is followed by an
article summarising an IPC study of conditional cash transfers in 15 African low-income
countries, and a presentation of an unconditional cash transfer pilot scheme in Zambia.
The next region in this journal is Asia, where two new Indian laws guarantee employment
for all poor households as well as the right to public information for full transparency;
furher, a pilot programme targeting the ultra-poor in Bangladesh shows promising results.
Then, the journal highlights the current trend in Latin America towards targeted
and conditional cash transfers. Although homegrown and originated with domestic
funding, these programmes have received enthusiastic and substantial support from
the international community, and they are being promoted elsewhere. What are the
challenges and lessons from this region and are they transferable? Another domestic
model is provided by the targeted and comprehensive Chile Solidario programme.
Finally, there is a bilateral donor representative’s view of the role of social protection
with cash transfers in promoting pro-poor growth and poverty reduction; also how
donors are working together with developing country partners for providing more
effective support towards this end.
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Front-page: Photo by Fabio Veras, IPC, of a
drawing on the mud wall of the house
of a beneficiary of the Kalomo pilot project (see
page 12). The woman heading this household
in Mukwela village, Zambia, is Deliya Maposa,
63 years old, suffering from chest pain and
swollen legs. She keeps 4 grandchildren, all
orphans, ranging from 6 to 18 years. The
household coped by begging before receiving
the project cash transfers.
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Social policy involves choices about
whether the core principle behind social
provisioning will be “universalism” or
selectivity through “targeting”. Under
universalism, the entire population is
entitled to social benefits, while under
targeting, eligibility is means-tested.
There is hardly ever pure universalism
or targeting, however; policy regimes
are often hybrid and tend to lie between
the two extremes, but where they lie can
be decisive in spelling out individuals’
life chances and in characterizing the
social order.
Since the 1980s, the balance in both
developed and developing countries
has tilted from universalistic policies
towards targeting. In the developed
countries, this led to the shift from
welfare to workfare states; many social
welfare policies have been redesigned
to narrow the scope of recipients by
targeting benefits e.g. through means
tests, income tests, status characteristics
and behavioural conditionality.
In developing countries, the choice
has been limited by the context of
macroeconomic and aid policies.
Ideologies play an important role in the
choice of instruments used to address
problems of poverty, and inequality.
Although the choice between targeting
and universalism is couched in the
language of efficient allocation of
resources subject to budget constraints
and the exigencies of globalization,
what is at stake is the fundamental
question about a polity’s values and
its responsibilities to all citizens. In the
1980s and 1990s, neoliberal ideology set
limits on social policy and pushed for
user fees, means-testing and market
delivery of social services, which
eliminated the equity concerns that
have been central to all the successful
experiences of poverty reduction.
Another driving force behind selectivity
has been the perception that budgetary
restraint was overriding all other
considerations in the choice among
possible social policies. “Fiscal crisis”
provided an excellent opportunity for
the ideologically driven shift toward
targeting because it authorized the view
that targeting was the most efficient
option under the circumstances. Global
competition was invoked to change tax
policies and reduce “social wages”
represented by social transfers. Targeting
was used to restrict public spending and
cut taxes as “distorting” causes of poor
export performance.
A fundamental factor pushing social
policy toward targeting in the aid-
dependent economies is the changing
perception of aid and the centrality of
poverty in policy discourse. In these
countries, aid plays an important role
in shaping social policy. Aid policies are
embedded in the overall policies of the
donor countries and nowadays focused
on helping the poor.
In the context of “aid fatigue” it has
become politically necessary to
demonstrate either that aid either
directly reaches the poor or enhances
growth, which is good for the poor.
And efficiency has become a primary
policy objective, leading to the “New
Managerialism” with concepts from the
private sector replacing the principles
of public administration.
Growing awareness of disparities within
developing countries, and the fact that
only anaemic “trickle down” had occurred
with economic growth, led to “growth–
equity” strategies, featuring targeting
as both redistributive and cost-effective.
However, the experience in high- and
middle-income countries is that universal
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the choice has been limited
by macroeconomic and
aid policies.
This trend neglects historical
experience of political and
administrative feasibility
and of poverty impact.
Successful countries use
targeting as simply one
instrument for making
universal policies effective.4 United Nations Development Programme
support by the middle class of taxes
to finance welfare programmes. Indeed,
many studies of the “political economy
of targeting” indicate that the optimal
policy for the very poor is not narrowly
targeting benefits to them, once the
impact on political support is taken
into account.
Hence the paradox of redistribution: the
more benefits are targeted to the poorest,
the less likely is durable poverty and
inequality reduction.
The choice between targeting and
universalism is quintessentially a political
economy problem: it involves the choice
of instruments for redistributing resources
in society and for determining levels
of social expenditure. These issues are
particularly poignant in the context of
shrinking budgetary resources– that is,
the context often used as an argument
for targeting.
In poor countries, where the funds to
be targeted often come from outside
and are supposed to be disbursed by
autonomous specialized agencies
or NGOs, the tendency has been to
conduct the discussion on poverty
in a “non-political” or technocratic way.
The focus is on the problem of disbursing
external resources (aid), and not on that
of generating the resources required
for the task.
Thus such an approach does not deal with
the relationship between targeting and the
political economy of domestic resource
mobilization, and rarely does it consider
the variations in the budget that may
actually be determined by the chosen
method and pattern of distribution.
The paradigm shift from “development”
to “poverty reduction” has narrowed the
remit of social policies. The preference
for targeting reflects the residual role
assigned to social policy as an instrument
for correcting some of the negative
outcomes of macroeconomic policies.
One implicit assumption is that social
policy is only about poverty alleviation,
whereas it often has other objectives,
such as equity and national or social
cohesion. Another is that social transfers
only lead to consumption, which reduces
long-term growth. Universalistic policies
are seen as part of the advanced welfare
state, and poor countries should await
their turn before introducing such policies.
Such a view is ahistorical. In a context of
development, social policy has typically
had a multiplicity of objectives as
part of a broad agenda of economic
development and social transformation.
The experience of late industrializers–
and low-income countries that have
done relatively well in terms of social
development– clearly suggests that
universal provisioning of social services
is an important ingredient.
Turning to the cost-effectiveness
arguments for limiting direct spending
by targeting the poor: what about
indirect costs, such as administrative
and transaction costs? Targeting involves
mechanisms that discriminate between
the poor and the non-poor. The ability to
measure poverty and identify the poor
is essential for designing any targeted
transfer programme. There are theoretical
models for achieving this, but in practice
targeting is faced with formidable
administrative hurdles, especially in poor
countries where the informal sector is
a major source of livelihood and poor
people’s “visibility” to the state is low,
and the  overall state capacity is weak.
In recognition of these difficulties, there
have been attempts to use categorical
targeting (geographic, demographic,
gender, household and so on). Other
selection arrangements have also been
resorted to, especially self-selection and
community-based targeting mechanisms.
Many of these arrangements are very
blunt instruments to achieve the much
touted efficiency of selectivity, and they
simply shift the problem from one level
to another.
 They often result in both
types of targeting errors: undercoverage
of the poor and leakage to the non-poor.
A sharper form of geographical
targeting is community targeting,
which presumably allows for better
identification of the needy. However,
community-based programmes also
have their local political demands and
prerequisites, their gender bias, their
patronage and clientelism, and may run
counter to the universalistic cultures of
local communities.
 They can exacerbate
local differentiation, be captured by local
elites who may traditionally sanction
discrimination, and so on. In many cases,
deliberate exercise of administrative
discretion has led to the exclusion of
women. It is in the nature of targeting
that it vests a great deal of discretionary
power in the hands of bureaucrats, who
may use this capacity to manipulate the
social and cultural entitlement aspects
of targeted programmes.
Self-selection involves programmes such
as public works, in which only the poor
are likely to participate. They often
involve onerous and humiliating
procedures, designed to exclude the
non-poor. The measures used include
rationing of food or health subsidies
by queuing or inconvenient location of
distribution centres, subsidizing inferior
food staples or packaging in ways that
are unappealing to the non-poor.
There is considerable evidence that
stigmatization comes along with such
methods, and as a result also many
poor people stay away. The use of
such methods skirts the issue of how
the states relates to all its citizens.
While the literature on welfare policies
in OECD countries pays considerable
attention to issues of justice and dignity,
this does not seem to be the case for
developing countries. The possibilities of
stigmatization are widely acknowledged
but quickly passed over. In the context
of extreme deprivation it is tempting to
subscribe to a “full belly thesis”: people
cannot eat dignity or democracy.
However, there are serious issues of
justice that must be taken into account
in a poverty eradication programme that
accepts lack of dignity and self-respect as
an important dimension of poverty.
A major criticism of the welfare state is
that it breeds dependence of individuals
on the state. However, targeting does not
escape the problem of incentives. Indeed,
one widely recognized cost of targeting
is that of perverse incentives for changes
“Benefits meant exclusively
for the poor often end up
being poor benefits.”
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in people’s behaviour in attempts to
become or remain beneficiaries of
welfare policies, especially for the labour
supply of the poor. This high effective
marginal tax rate can act as disincentive
to getting out of the “poverty trap”.
Thus means-testing tends, through its
disincentive  effects, to be dysfunctional
with regard to social policy’s broader
aims of doing away with poverty and
dependency. Universal benefits, on the
other hand, do not damage market
incentives to take a job or save for
one’s own pension.
There is a second source of negative
incentive of targeting that can be
derived from broader notions of
poverty, which include vulnerability as a
key dimension. One implication of this is
that in measuring the efficacy of social
provision programmes, the gains must
be weighted by the probability of their
actually being received. The poor are
often risk averse, prefering lower risk to
potentially higher values of expected
future benefits.
Targeting typically involves uncertainty
about whether the ration will in
practice be received or not, especially
in situations where there is a high risk
of being excluded even when one is
among the “deserving poor”. In
addition, high consumption variability
comes at a cost, not just in terms of
current welfare but also in terms
of long-term poverty reduction: the
choices made by households ex ante,
and shocks ex post, may result in the
poor being locked into poverty traps.
Universal policies, on the other hand,
reduce their ex ante vulnerability with
high certainty and predictability.
In conclusion, a remarkable feature
of the debate on universalism and
targeting is the disjuncture between
an unrelenting argumentation for
targeting, and a stubborn slew of
empirical evidence suggesting that
targeting is not effective in addressing
poverty (as broadly understood). Most
studies clearly show that identifying
and reaching only the poor involves
high administrative costs and requires





has narrowed the remit
of social policies.
Where poverty is rampant and
institutions are weak, what may be
wrong is not the lack of appropriate data
but targeting per se. In many countries,
the shredding of the state apparatus has
left it singularly incapable of effective
targeting in the social sector. Most of
the proposed refinements of targeting
methods are likely to compound the
problems that are often cited as
constraints on it.
Assuming that poverty reduction is a
straightforward and well-defined social
objective, it is easy to argue that scarce
resources should be concentrated on those
in need. However, neither the objectives
nor the constraints are simple; they are
both subject to political processes that
determine what is to be allocated and
to whom and for what reasons.
The current emphasis on targeting draws
very little from historical experience both
in terms of political and administrative
feasibility and of poverty impact. This
is partly a reflection of the distance
between development studies and the
study of welfare policies in the developed
countries. Consequently, there is a lot
of reinvention of the wheel, and wasteful
and socially costly experimentation with
ideas that have been clearly demonstrated
to be the wrong ones for the countries
in which they are being imposed. There
is ample evidence of poor countries that
have reduced poverty through universal
social provision and from whose
experiences much can be learnt.
In reality, most governments tend to
have a mixture of both universal and
targeted social policies. However, in the
more successful countries, overall social
policy itself has been universalistic, and
targeting has been used as simply one
instrument for making universalism
effective; such “targeting within
universalism” directs extra benefits to
low-income groups within the context
of a universal policy design and
involves the fine-tuning of what are
fundamentally universalist policies.
Thandika Mkandawire: Targeting and
Universalism in Poverty Reduction;
Social Policy and Development Programme
Paper No. 23, UNRISD, Geneva, 2005.6 United Nations Development Programme
The national and international
commitments to global poverty
reduction reflected in the Millennium
Development Goals have focused
attention on the extent and persistence
of poverty in developing countries.
However, effective poverty eradication
implies aiming beyond the MDG 1
target to halve, between 1990 and 2015,
the proportion of people with incomes
below US$ 1 per day – now about 1
billion people. More attention needs
to be paid to the plight of the 300 to 420
million chronically poor people in the
world, and to developing comprehensive,
coherent, and sustained interventions
that support their efforts to improve
their situation.
Duration is a key dimension of poverty,
and poverty persistence is the result
of multiple deprivations. There is an
emerging consensus around the view
that social protection can be an effective
response to persistent poverty and
vulnerability. However, it has so far had a
very limited role as a response to chronic
and extreme poverty. Largely for this
reason, researchers and policy makers
commonly consider social protection as
a tool for addressing transitory poverty
and temporary shocks. This represents
a narrow view of social protection as a
basic safety net and short term response
to crises and shocks.
This article challenges such a position
and argues for a broader conceptualisation
of social protection, involving both
protection and livelihood promotion,
which can be shown to be effective in
assisting the vulnerable, the transitorily
poor, and the poorest of the poor.
Broader social protection addresses
poverty dynamics, and the full range
of factors that keep people in poverty.
It moves beyond the limited roles and
interventions that derive from the World
Bank’s Social Risk Management
framework, which has dominated
thinking. This broader vision envisages
social protection as having both short-
and long-term roles in poverty reduction:
helping people to conserve and
accumulate assets, and transforming
their socio-economic relationships so that
they are not constrained from seizing
opportunities by, for example,
clientelism. In cases where people are
dependent on others, because of age,
ill-health or disability, then this broader
vision envisages long-term forms of
social assistance such as grants and
non-contributory pensions.
Social protection has come to define an
agenda for social policy in developing
countries. It is an evolving perspective
with a number of common basic features,
without clearly defined boundaries.
Social protection
– focuses on poverty prevention and
reduction; on providing support to
the vulnerable, poor and poorest; and
on addressing the causes of poverty,
not simply its symptoms;
– is grounded in the view that the
causes of poverty are to be found
in the multiple hazards, risks, and
stresses faced by the poor, and in
their vulnerability to the impact of
these on their well-being. These
impact the poor directly, through,
for example, lower consumption and
asset depletion, but also indirectly
through behavioural responses with
long-term detrimental effects on
welfare, productivity and income;
– acknowledges the variety and
heterogeneity of hazards, risks,
and stresses affecting individuals,
households and communities,
paying due attention to the
multidimensional nature of poverty;
– seeks to support and develop the





David Hulme and Karen Moore,**
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Social protection measures
are much more than short-
term safety nets. They also
include livelihood promotion,
asset transfer and initiatives
for social mobilisation that
can empower the poor to
take up opportunities.
Broader social protection
addresses the full range of
factors – including political,
cultural and social factors –
that keep people in poverty.
It supports the agency of the
poor by broadening the
range of responses to
hazards, risk and stresses –
thus avoiding poverty traps.
Policymakers should adopt
a broader view of social
protection, and see it as
helping both the poor and
the poorest.
* Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, UK
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hazards, risks and stresses, placing
a particular focus on household
investment as key to poverty
prevention and reduction;
– designs and evaluates interventions
as investments rather than costs; and
– involves a wide range of local,
national and international
stakeholders in the development of
social protection instruments in
developing countries.
Social protection narrowly conceived is
of only limited use in addressing chronic
and extreme poverty. From a narrow
perspective, chronic and extreme poverty is
caused by insufficient welfare-generating
assets, such as land or human capital,
whereas transitory poverty and
vulnerability are factors of the variability
in the returns from these assets. To the
extent that the factors determining
chronic and extreme poverty are taken
to be different from those determining
transitory poverty, policy bifurcation
would necessarily follow. Social
protection would appear to be more
effective in addressing transitory poverty,
would focus on those hovering around
the poverty line and would seek to
strengthen their access to protective
instruments such as insurance. By
contrast, policies seeking to assist the
poorest would need to target them
directly and focus on building their
assets (e.g. land ownership, education)
through livelihood promotion and/or
asset redistribution.
Such anti-poverty policy bifurcation
is appealing because of its clarity, but is
also an oversimplification of the nature
of poverty with few practical advantages.
Uncertainty over asset liquidity and
prices is one of the factors undermining
asset accumulation by the poor, the very
process of which can actually increase
their exposure to market risks.
Distinguishing the target groups for
distinct policy interventions is hard,
because the poorest, transitorily poor
and vulnerable non-poor are fluid and
fuzzy rather than static and crisp sets.
Highly restrictive assumptions are
needed to achieve the ‘crisp’ distinctions
that policy bifurcation entails.
Conventional means of identifying the
poor in a policy context depend on a
significant measure of indeterminacy
about the categorisation of individuals
and households into chronically and
transitorily poor, or extremely and
moderately poor. This often leads to
an over-reliance on income and/or
consumption measures of poverty
that neglect its multidimensionality
and ignore the significance of
measurement error.
Only a very restricted conceptualisation
of social protection can support an anti-
poverty policy bifurcation of the type
postulated. In a policy context, it makes
sense to see the poor/vulnerable and
poorest as overlapping sets. In a broader
perspective on social protection, hazards,
risk and stresses are key to the poverty
generating process, and this includes
both chronic and transitory poverty. The
chronically poor face higher risks, have
fewer buffers allowing them to protect
their well-being, and are forced to
adopt risk minimising strategies that
can lead to poverty traps. Broader
social protection seeks to strengthen
the capacity of the poor to protect their
consumption and to support household
investment in the assets required to
manage and overcome their situation.
Much of the strength of the case for
broader social protection rests on the
light it throws on the behavioural
responses adopted by the poor to the
hazards, risks and stresses they face.
These include trading off lower risk for
adverse incorporation through, for
example, living ‘under the wings’ of a
patron, adopting safer but lower return
production techniques or reducing
investment in physical and human
capital, as well as a variety of strategies
to avoid or reduce risk and bolster
resilience. Broader social protection
supports the agency of the poor by
broadening the range of behavioural
responses to hazards, risk and stresses
available to them, thus avoiding poverty
traps. This involves considering a range
of factors that may constrain the poor,
including political, cultural and social
factors, and aims to empower the poor
to take up opportunities.
Specific examples of social protection
policies that have achieved a measure
of success in improving the conditions of
the poorest are given below as well as in
text boxes with other articles in this issue.
The Kalomo District Pilot Cash Transfer
programme in Zambia (page 12)
represents a new type of social
protection initiative in Africa, built
around regular cash transfers to
critically poor and labour-constrained
households aimed at improving their
food security. The identification of
beneficiaries relies on community
decision-making. Preliminary
evaluations show that cash transfer
programmes can be successful in
Some definitions
Social protection is associated with a number of key concepts that are used in different
ways by different people. Some of the terms used in this article are here defined.
Social protection focuses on the threats to well-being arising from hazards, risks and stresses.
 Hazards are events which, if they materialize, can adversely affect the consumption
and investment plans of households. Unemployment, sickness and drought are typical
hazards threatening the well-being of the poor.
 Risk is the probability that hazards will materialize. For example, research shows
that the poor face a higher risk of sickness.
 Stresses are typically continuous and cumulative pressures that adversely affect
well-being, such as low wage rates or having to work excessive numbers of hours.
Households and communities deploy a range of buffers to protect their well-being
against hazards, risks and stresses, including assets, insurance, social networks and public
entitlements. The poor are especially vulnerable because they face higher risk of hazards
and stresses, and have fewer buffers. Social protection involves interventions from public,
private, voluntary organizations, and social networks, to support individuals, households
and communities prevent, manage, and overcome the hazards, risks, and stresses
threatening their present and future well-being.8 United Nations Development Programme
Environmental shocks and poverty traps
Droughts, hurricanes and other environmental shocks punctuate the lives of poor and vulnerable people in many parts of the world. The direct
and immediate impacts can be horrific. Yet the full economic effects go well beyond the shock itself. Affected households suffer a loss of assets
and livelihoods that may have long-lasting effects. Poor people often have to rely on coping strategies that may push them into poverty traps
from which they cannot recover, for example depleting key assets. Fear of being trapped in chronic destitution leads others to protect assets
at the expense of consumption, with long-term ill effects on household health and capacity.
A poverty trap is a critical asset threshold below which successful economic recovery becomes unlikely. A sudden shock that destroys assets
may push a family below the minimum threshold that allows it to educate its children, build up productive capacity and recover over time.
A protracted shock may have little direct impact on family assets, but instead expose people to a sequence of destabilizing events that force
them to either sell assets to sustain consumption, or reduce consumption in order to defend assets.
The full economic effects of an environmental disaster evolve through three stages: the shock itself, the coping period, and the post-shock
recovery phase. A household’s prior wealth and the nature of local markets and social institutions will determine its sensitivity to the shock
and its resilience during the coping and recovery phases.
An environmental shock typically has two immediate impacts: it destroys lives and assets directly and reduces consumption as crops fail
and household medical expenses rise. Then comes the coping period, where people react to the income and asset losses from the shock.
Households without access to financial and labour markets can only protect their consumption by reducing their assets. The severity of
this secondary asset decline is shaped by a household’s ability to employ alternative coping strategies, and by changes in the relative
prices of assets vis-à-vis food and other necessities.
Unfavorable price swings normally result from the sudden liquidation of assets in response to a shock, such as the distress sale of cattle in
a drought-prone area. Reducing consumption might be a last resort for those lacking assets or options. This strategy may also be pursued
by households reluctant to increase future vulnerability by depleting asset stocks now. However, the cost of cutting consumption is very
high – immediate hunger, and a likely irreversible reduction in young children’s growth and future capacity.
Finally, the recovery phase is the period when households try to replace assets lost to the disaster and depleted through coping strategies.
The market and social mechanisms that broker access to employment and finance also shape households’ post-shock resilience, and so the
extent to which they can start accumulating assets again and rebuilding their lives.
Michael R. Carter et al., “The long-term impacts of short-term shocks: Poverty traps and environmental disasters in Ethiopia
and Honduras”, BASIS Brief no. 28, May 2005.
low-income countries with limited
administrative capacity, and are
effectively deployed by households.
The Targeting the Ultra Poor Programme
(TUP) in Bangladesh (page 14) grew out
of a narrowly conceived food aid project.
The country’s Vulnerable Group Feeding
Programme (VGF) provided for people’s
immediate needs, but made little difference
to their longer term prospects. VGF was
extended into the Income Generation
for Vulnerable Group Development
Programme (IGVGD), incorporating
savings, training and microcredit. This
performed well but did not reach the
poorest, and many of its beneficiaries later
fell back into poverty. The experimental
TUP (now being expanded) took an
even broader approach, and included
asset transfers and local institutional
development in its mechanisms. There
is increasing evidence that this broad-
based social protection programme,
incorporating a social safety net,
livelihood promotion, asset transfer and
 Policymakers should adopt a broader
view of social protection and see it as
helping both the poor and the poorest.
 Social protection is much more than
short-term safety nets. It also includes
livelihood promotion, asset transfer
and social mobilisation and
empowerment initiatives.
 Policymakers in public, non-profit
and private organisations need to
experiment with innovative
programmes, as illustrated in this
collection, and scale up effective
forms of assistance.
 Social protection can both reduce
poverty directly and raise the
probability of poor households
being able to take advantage
of the opportunities created
by economic growth.
Barrientos, A., Hulme, D. and Shepherd, A.:
Can Social Protection Tackle Chronic
Poverty?  European Journal of Development
Research, 17/1: 8 – 23, 2005.
empowerment, can reach Bangladesh’s
poorest households and help them
break out of long-term poverty traps.
The Chile Solidario programme
(page 17) introduced in 2002 constitutes
a response by the Chilean government
to the persistence of extreme poverty in
a country with two decades of high rates
of economic growth. This led to the view
that both economic growth and strong
but generic anti-poverty programmes
were insufficient to eradicate extreme
poverty, and that an integrated and
comprehensive programme focused on
the 250,000 extremely poor households
was required. Chile Solidario is
grounded in the view that poverty
is multi-dimensional, and aims to support
households with deficits along a range
of different dimensions.
A number of lessons are emerging from
work looking at the ways in which social
protection policies can support the
chronically and extreme poor:International Poverty Centre   Poverty In Focus   June  2006    9
An Income Grant
to all South Africans?
by Haroon Bhorat,
Development Policy Research Unit,
University of Cape Town
There has been an important
public policy debate in South
Africa about a basic income
grant (BIG) scheme that
would include the many
unemployed in the state
social security system.
Two-thirds of current
transfers benefit two large
groups – the aged and
children, and indirectly
also most unemployed,
but not enough to take
them out of poverty.
However, a BIG scheme that
cut absolute poverty by more
than half would be very costly,
thus implying tough political
trade-off choices
One of the key challenges facing the
post-apartheid government of South Africa
is the need to significantly reduce the
high incidence of poverty.  Social welfare
interventions are prominent features of
the policy agenda. The government
cannot rely on economic growth alone
to reduce poverty given extreme levels of
unemployment; the domestic economy is
experiencing positive growth rates, but it
is not functioning effectively as a creator
of jobs. The state has to assume a crucial role
as a provider of social security to alleviate
the afflictions of poverty and indigence.
It has been argued that social transfers must
be a key ingredient in any national poverty
alleviation strategy. This article analyses
the poverty-reduction opportunities
presented by such transfers as well as
the macroeconomic constraints involved.
After an overview of the existing social
security arrangements within the country,
a universal income grant scheme is
assessed. This article is the summary of a
paper contributing to an important public
policy debate in the country on such a
transfer scheme by presenting empirical
evidence on its possible consequences.
Government views fiscal restraint as vital.
The Growth, Employment and Redistribution
(GEAR) strategy aims inter alia, to reduce
the fiscal deficit/GDP ratio. This principle
has guided public expenditures in recent
years and is likely to remain in place over
the medium-term.  It implies a constraint
for further expansion of state expenditure
on social services and general provisions
for interventions designed to reduce
poverty or engender employment.
The share of social services in the
government’s total expenditure has
increased from under 45% to about 51%
over five years and it will increase, albeit
marginally, to nearly 52% in the 2008/09
financial year within the Medium Term
Expenditure Framework (MTEF). Over one
third of this high share of social service
expenditure is allocated to education.
South Africa is one of the highest
spenders on education in the world,
as a percentage of both GDP and total
fiscal expenditure. Thus, education
captures about 18% of total fiscal
outlays in 2006, followed by social
security & welfare with nearly 16%.
There is unlikely to be a dramatic
increase in the share of expenditure
going to social security and welfare
over the medium term. Apart from
many departments chasing limited
resources from the National Treasury,
there is the crucial issue of the debt
burden. Unlike other line items in
the budget, the debt service is not
negotiable. It represents a high
proportion – about 11% of total
state expenditure this year – making
it the third largest budget vote after
education and social services & welfare.
This ranking is likely to remain the
same for the next few years, at least.
The interest burden comes from the
poor fiscal management by the
apartheid regime which led to huge
debts to both foreign and domestic
lenders. As the majority government
tries to reduce this debt overhang,
lowering the value of the interest
burden is crucial. Not only does it send
a positive signal to foreign investors,
concerning South Africa’s prudent
fiscal management; it is also optimal
to facilitate fiscal expansion only once
debt levels are manageable.
Social welfare payments make up an
increasingly important component of the
rapidly growing total spending on social
service provision. In the last few years
they have overtaken health expenditures,
while remaining below those for10 United Nations Development Programme
education. Government’s priorities over
the next 2 years have been carefully laid
out in the MTEF, and they are unlikely to
be altered in any dramatic manner.
Within the social welfare budget,
allocations are made by the Department
of Social Development (DSD) to various
forms of social assistance. The old age
pension is the largest item by far with
38% of the Department’s total transfer
expenditure reaching about 2 million
individuals. The value of each grant is
R780, which is equal to the disability
grant but differs marginally from that
of the war veterans’ pension.  The second
most important transfer scheme is the
Child Support Grant (CSG) accounting
for 29% of the DSD’s transfer expenditure,
and reaching about 5.6 million individuals.
Hence, two-thirds of the transfer
expenditure in South Africa is accounted
for by a well-developed and extensive
scheme for two of the target groups in
the society – the aged and children.
However, for a significant number of
indigent and needy communities the
scheme is not adequate. The CSG is set
at an extremely low level of R180 per
child, per month. Any attempt to increase
(for example) the CSG would inevitably
mean that the value of another transfer
scheme is reduced.  Within a total budget
that will in all probability not change
significantly, there would seem to be
little room for manoeuvrability.
Income grants are important for the social
safety of poor households rather than
individuals. This is made clear when one
looks for example at the role of these
transfers in supporting the unemployed.
In 2004, about 56% of all unemployed had
access to at least one recipient of an income
transfer. In non-metropolitan areas, 64%
of the unemployed are in homes with at
least one income transfer recipient.
It is clear therefore that old age pensions,
disability grants and more recently, the child
support grant, perform a welfare function
for a significant share of the unemployed.
However, for households including
unemployed persons, the transfer is
not sufficient to raise them above the
poverty line. For example, among all
African unemployed with access to old
age pensions or disability grants, 80% live
below the poverty line. Amongst the rural
unemployed with access to two or more
grants, 84% live below the poverty line.
These data have led to the notion of a
national basic income grant (BIG) scheme.
This would widen the current social
welfare provision of the state to include
also the unemployed, who are now
uncovered by any direct assistance, despite
arguably being the most vulnerable group
in society. A BIG scheme would be part
of the state’s long-term social welfare
strategy. But is it economically feasible?
To answer that key question, a statistical
analysis was undertaken to estimate
the cost to the state of cash transfers
to minimize the national incidence
of poverty, considering the different
population categories. The simulations
were closely linked to the specific
proposals on a BIG scheme tabled
variously by the labour union
movement and the Department of Welfare.
The poverty-reduction effects of such
a universal grant would be significant:
at R 100 per month it would reduce (i) the
incidence of households under the poverty
line by 51%, and (ii) the mean poverty gap
by 67%. The corresponding figures for a
R 50 grant would be 27% and 42%; for R 200:
77% and 85%, and for R 300: 86% and 92%.
Extending the old-age pension system by
reducing the qualifying age by 20 years
would reduce poverty incidence by 38%
and the poverty gap by 46%. This is
an important policy-relevant result: it
would involve lower transaction costs
then setting up a new large transfer
scheme, while having similar poverty
effects to a R 50-100 BIG.
Although these poverty reduction effects
are crucial, the argument for such a grant
in fact turns on the potential cost of such
a scheme. A tentative attempt made at
costing the grant under different
assumptions, made it evident that the
fiscal pressures would be enormous.
For example, in 1999 the cost of a R 100
grant scheme would have amounted to
39% of government’s total expenditures,
and more than double the Department
of Social Development’s budget.
Financing through the VAT system, would
mean increasing the VAT rate from 14%
to 32%.  If the deficit-financing route was
taken, the budget deficit for 1999 would
balloon from 2% of GDP to about 9%
of GDP. These simple calculations are
indicative of the huge cost pressures
that could arise, should such a universal
scheme be instituted.
However, these types of hard costing
exercises cannot be seen in isolation
from the obvious welfare enhancing
effects of a universal income grant.
The trade-off is there, and it is up to
the politicians to find the right balance.
Bhorat, H.: A universal income grant scheme
for South Africa: An empirical assessment.
In: G. Standing & M. Samson (eds), A basic
income grant for South Africa. Cape Town,
UCT Press, 2003, p. 77-101.International Poverty Centre   Poverty In Focus   June  2006    11
Would cash transfer programmes
in Africa have significant impact
on income poverty and school
attendance?
An IPC simulation study indicates
that affordable programmes
would not improve poverty
measures much, whereas large
costly ones would have important
effects on income poverty but not
on school attendance.
The success of  cash transfer
programmes in some countries is no
guarantee that they can be reproduced
in other countries with the same
performance. But their example can
yield both good practices and notes
of caution and challenges in design
and implementation. A useful tool for
assessing the order of magnitude of
transfers needed for the desired impact
on targeted areas and populations is
ex-ante evaluation.
Such a study recently assessed the impact
of cash transfers on income poverty and
school attendance in 15 Sub-Saharan
African (SSA) countries* through exploring
different budget scenarios and targeting
strategies. The data source is household
surveys, and the study is limited to
estimating short-term income effects
on demand for primary education. Not
covered aspects are: (i) school availability
and quality, (ii) the effect of conditionality,
and (iii) long-term poverty impact of
school attendance.
In the 15 countries, children in school
age (5-16 years) make up around 35%
of the total population; most of these,
19%, are 5-10 years old. The incidence
of poverty among all school-age
children is higher than/close to the
national average, but among children
not attending school it is far higher:
around two-thirds. This is on average
17% higher than the national average
in the 15 countries, while the poverty
gap is 22% higher, and the severity of
poverty is 24% higher.
The primary school net enrolment rate in
SSA is around 60% – much lower than
in other regions. Moreover, only 54% in
the age-group 5-10 years attend school,
i.e. 29 million children do not. These rates
vary a lot: in Madagascar, 91% of children
in this age group attended school, but in
Mozambique only 31% did. The share
of children attending school in the 15
countries rises from age 5 to 11 years
and then falls steadily, mostly at the
secondary school level.
The study attempts to quantify the impact
of cash transfers on national poverty. The
poverty simulation results indicate that
a transfer of 0.5% of GDP to all school-age
children has a very small impact: poverty
incidence falls by only about 1%, the
poverty gap by about 2%, and the
severity of poverty by about 4%.
Targeting children in poor and/or rural
households results in much greater total
poverty reduction as per capita transfers
are higher than in universal programs.
Yet the benefits of the transfer under the
targeted programme will be partly offset
by the administrative costs of identifying
and reaching the neediest households.
Targeting rural children is administratively
less costly than targeting all poor children
and may be a more cost-effective policy
option for reducing poverty than
universal programs.
The study also assesses how much
difference larger cash transfers would
make when increased to 20%, 30%,
and 40% of the national poverty line,
compared to the scenario of 0.5% of
GDP. The larger transfers have far greater
effect on income poverty but may not
be affordable for most African countries.
The cost of cash transfers at 40% of the
poverty line varies from a low around
5% of GDP for the Ivory Coast to a high
well over 16% of GDP for Burundi.
The school attendance impact is
insignificant when the budget for
unconditional cash transfers is set
at 0.5% of GDP. The impact increases
somewhat with larger transfers, but even
at 40% of the average national poverty





* The 15 countries in the study include:
Burundi, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire,
Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Gambia,
Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Malawi,
Nigeria, Uganda, and Zambia.12 United Nations Development Programme
line, the estimated impact on school
attendance is very modest (see Figure).
Does the fact that even a large
unconditional cash transfer programme
would not engender a substantial
increase in school attendance imply
that a conditional program would?
This study cannot answer that question,
which depends on i.a. the quality of
schooling and the capacity to administer
and monitor a conditional programme.
The UNDP International Poverty Center
is planning a new research project
comparing Africa and Latin America
to illuminate these issues.
N. Kakwani, Fabio Veras Soares and
H. Son: Conditional Cash Transfers in African
Countries, UNDP International Poverty Center,
Working Paper No. 9, November 2005.
The Pilot Social Cash Transfer Scheme in Kalomo District, Zambia
Food poverty and vulnerability is widespread in Zambia. Half the population suffers from chronic hunger according to FAO: over five million
people in one million households. Some 700,000 households are poor because they lack productive work and access to credit or programmes
such as food or cash for work that could take them out of food poverty. The other 300,000 households are structurally poor with few/no
able-bodied adult household members.
Of the latter, over one million people in 200,000 households – 10% of the population – suffer critical levels of food poverty and are unable
to respond to development opportunities. Many are AIDS-affected; breadwinners have died leaving grandparents and orphans unable to
respond to self-help oriented programmes. In these households, 60% are children whose basic needs of nutrition, health services, clothing
and education are not met. Some of these destitute households are targeted by the Kalomo Pilot Social Cash Transfer Scheme with support
from the Government of Zambia and the German aid agency GTZ.
Approved households without children receive ZMK30,000 (US$6) in cash monthly, while households with children receive ZMK40,000
(US$ 8). The transfer does not lift the beneficiary households out of poverty but it does alleviate life-threatening food poverty. If they choose
to spend it on maize, it will buy a second daily meal. It is assumed that beneficiary households know best what they need most in order to
survive; that they spend the money wisely; and that household heads (mostly older women) spend most of the cash on children in the
household. All these assumptions are closely monitored and have so far proved to be realistic.
Selection of beneficiary households is undertaken by Community Welfare Assistance Committees (CWACs), whose members are elected
or approved by the community. After training, CWACs use a multi-stage process to select the 10% of households who are most needy and
labor-constrained. Payments to households living near Kalomo Town are channeled through accounts in the local bank. For those living
further away “Pay Points” have been established at rural health centers and schools.
At the end of 2004, around 4,000 persons in 1,027 households received monthly cash transfers. Of these, 66% are female-headed,
54% are elderly-headed, and at least 54% are AIDS-affected; 61% of the household members are children, of whom 71% are orphans.
Both targeted beneficiaries and the local community report that the transfers have improved the well-being of the poorest households.
Recipients use them to buy food and other basic needs (e.g. blankets, soap, school books). Some beneficiaries have even saved some cash
(including through a rotating fund), and invested in seeds and small animals.
If the Social Cash Transfer Scheme were extended to all 200,000 destitute and labor-constrained households in Zambia, annual costs would
amount to US$21 million – about 5% of annual foreign aid inflow, or 0.5% of Zambian GDP. This means that national social cash transfers are
affordable – especially if government and donors share the costs.  However, more and larger pilots are needed to assess the feasibility and
costs of full scaling-up of the scheme.
Schubert, B.: The Pilot Social Cash Transfer Scheme, Kalomo District – Zambia. Chronic Poverty Research Centre Working Paper 52, 2005.
Manchester: IDPM/ CPRC.International Poverty Centre   Poverty In Focus   June  2006    13
The UN Millennium Development
Goals are unlikely to be achieved unless
India, with the world’s largest number of
poor, manages to do its part. Employment-
intensive economic growth will be
crucial. Employment has been growing
in the 1990s but not in manufacturing,
only in services. The rural poor have
been left behind, dependent for their
livelihoods upon India’s slow-growing
agriculture, which still accounts for 59%
of total employment.
The National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act (NREGA) was adopted in 2005 to reduce
rural poverty. It guarantees employment
at least 100 days a year at the minimum
wage to one person from every poor
household. This is estimated to raise
two-thirds of India’s population below
the poverty line above it.
NREGA schemes will improve rural
infrastructure e.g. roads, school buildings
and village water supply. Further, watershed
development reduces damage to life and
property caused by frequent flooding,
and saves future costs in government
flood relief. Along with land regeneration
and prevention of soil erosion it also
protects the environment and enhances
land productivity, promoting future
growth and rural employment.
Positive second-round effects are also
expected with higher incomes generating
rising demand, employment and rural
wages, as well as investment in human
capital by making schooling affordable
and reducing drop-outs.
The cost of NREGA was an initial criticism. In
the first phase, the 200 poorest districts are
covered. The total cost is estimated to rise
from 0.5% of GDP in the first year to 1% of
GDP in the last year of the inception phase
(2008). Thereafter, the ratio will decrease
along with the number of poor households.
The consolidation of existing
employment generation schemes
with the programme of employment
guarantee will increase efficiency in
resource use. The scheme is modelled
on a similar scheme implemented
successfully for 20 years in Maharashtra
State, but the preceding calculations
assume much higher unit costs. These
could come down with more labour
intensity. The costs are considerable,
but should be affordable.
However, the Government of India may
have to raise its revenues; it collects only
8-9% of GDP, compared to nearly 22% in
China in 2003 and 14% of GDP for all low-
income countries 1990-2001. Tax revenue
ratios normally rise with higher income;
they are about 19 per cent for lower-
middle income countries, and 23 per cent
for upper-middle income countries. But
in India they have actually fallen from
almost 11% in the late 1980s to 9.3%,
despite rising incomes. Just raising the
central government’s tax/GDP ratio to its
late eighties level – already underway –
would more than pay for the full
implementation of NREGA.
Critics have also argued that the
Act would expand opportunity for
bureaucratic corruption. However, it
has been demonstrated around India that
effective monitoring by the community
of government spending is not only
possible, it is effective. Ensuring such
effective monitoring requires the right
to information and social audits.
The Indian Right to Information Act (RTI)
became fully operational in October
2005. It empowers every citizen with
the right to obtain information from the
Government; civil society organizations
have demonstrated in Delhi and
Rajasthan how social audits can
bring bureaucratic corruption to heal.
Job Law with Right
to Information can
Cut Poverty in India
by Santosh Mehrotra,
UNDP Regional Centre for Asia,
Bangkok
A new Indian law guarantees
employment for one person
from every poor household
at least 100 days a year;
another the right to public
information for full
transparency.




The cost would be paid
in full just by restoring
previous tax revenue levels.14 United Nations Development Programme
A key provision of the new RTI Act
requires proactive disclosure of a range
of information. It is the obligation of the
government, including all levels of state
and local government, to publish key
information without being requested
to do so by citizens. Such information
includes the budget allocated to each
Panchayati Raj Institution (PRI), indicating
particulars of all plans, proposed
expenditures and reports of disbursements;
and detailed plan of the implementation
of subsidy programmes, including the
amounts allocated and the details and
beneficiaries of such programmes.
These details are to be posted on the walls
of the panchayats as well as on boards at
the worksites. In addition, PRI legislation in
all states also requires proactive disclosure
of information through village council
meetings or on notice boards. Furthermore,
the RTI Act obliges government officials to
provide particular information upon
request; citizens have to apply for
documents from the responsible officer,
who is then duty bound to provide the
information within 30 days at a nominal
charge. Families living below the poverty
line are exempt from paying fees.
Thus, it is clear that:
 Citizens can now obtain all NREGA
documents under the RTI Act;
BRAC’s experiences of targeting the poorest in Bangladesh
Mainstream development approaches, such as microfinance, do not respond to the risks faced by the poorest. Most programmes targeting the
poorest are oriented towards managing crisis rather than creating opportunity ladders. BRAC, the largest development NGO in Bangladesh, has
experimented with a ‘linkage model’ for the poorest over the past two decades, using transfers as a strategic entry point. These experiences led
to the establishment in 2002 of a new programme Targeting the Ultra-poor (TUP) with the idea to enable them to develop new and better
options for sustainable livelihoods using a combination of approaches – both promotional (e.g. asset grants, skills training) and protective
(e.g. stipends, health services) – as well as addressing socio-political constraints at various levels.
TUP employs two broad strategies: pushing down through specific targeting of the ultra-poor and pushing out by addressing social-political
relations that disempower poor women and men, constraining their livelihoods. TUP engages village elites in order to maintain or strengthen
customary systems of social support for the poorest, while also providing more systematic community-level protection against the risks faced
by the ultra-poor. Ultra-poor women are able to work with a greater sense of security, knowing that their assets are at least nominally
protected by powerful village elites.
Early assessments of change suggest that average food intake levels of TUP participants have increased and become more diversified. Perceived
levels of food security and health status have also registered significant positive changes, and are reflected in health-seeking behaviour and
anthropometric improvements.  The first TUP participants have completed the two-year special investment phase and are organised into
separate village organisations. They are being offered a full range of BRAC’s development services, including microfinance. Based on previous
experience, BRAC is taking a flexible, experimental and member-driven approach to credit provision. About 70% have taken a first loan and
are repaying regularly. TUP is seen as a local success, rather than that of an external organisation.  There is pride in the achievements of TUP
participants, whose initial living conditions and prospects were so poor that they were routinely written off as beyond help.
Matin, I.:  Addressing vulnerabilities of the poorest: A micro perspective from BRAC.
Paper presented to the Annual Bank Conference in Development Economics, Amsterdam, May 2005.
<http://www.BRACresearch.org/publications/addressing_vulnerability_of_the_poorest.pdf>
 All NREGA related documents will
be available for public scrutiny;
 Copies of documents will be
made available at nominal costs;
 Muster rolls will be pro-actively
displayed at the Panchayat centre;
 All relevant documents will be
provided to the village council
by the implementing agencies;
 Village councils may conduct social
audits of all public works programmes.
Five days after the Right to Information
Act came into force; a public hearing in
Lakshmangarh village (Surguja District,
Chhattisgarh) showed how the Act can
empower ordinary people and enable
them to fight corruption. The public
hearing focused on the recent
construction of a pond under the
National Food-for-Work Programme.
According to the muster rolls, all the
labourers were paid the statutory
minimum wage of Rs 55 per day.
This was corroborated by labourers
at the public hearing. But in fact only
one fifth of the enrolled labourers
were actually there. The wages of the
other four fifths were appropriated by
corrupt officials.
It was found that all the thumbprints
in the muster roll were false, even in
the case of genuine labourers.
The workers had put their thumbprint
or had signed on a different muster roll –
an informal register maintained at the
worksite which is used for the purpose
of recording attendance and making
wage payments. But the official muster
roll is a separate document,
comprehensively fudged.
This practice of maintaining two muster
rolls, one for wage payments and one
for securing the release of funds, is
widespread. For decades, it has been
a convenient means of siphoning off
money from public works programmes.
As long as the muster rolls were
inaccessible to the public, this method
was relatively safe. It is not so any longer,
thanks to the RTI Act and active civic watch
groups and civil society organisations.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
launched the NREGA in February 2006.
He sought the cooperation of the State
Governments and other agencies to
put in place a sound monitoring system
and a grievance redress mechanism
to ensure that the Act had its intended
effect. At the launch ceremony, he
stated: “Three watch words should be
followed: outlays must be matched
by outcomes, productive assets must
be created and the guarantee must be
implemented in true spirit.”  International Poverty Centre   Poverty In Focus   June  2006    15
Conditional cash transfers
(CCTs) are grants provided to targeted
poor households on the condition they
engage in human capital investment.
They address demand-side constraints
for poverty reduction, combining short-
term objectives of safety nets with long-
term goals of breaking intergenerational
poverty traps. With substantial support
from the international community, CCTs
have become popular in many countries.
Mexico was the first country to introduce
a nation-wide CCT programme, Progresa,
in 1997. In 2002 it was expanded in
coverage and scope and renamed
Oportunidades. Brazil in 2001 started the
Bolsa Escola programme, which in 2003
was unified with other federal CCTs
into Bolsa Família.
Progresa was introduced as an innovative
and apolitical program consisting of
cash and in-kind transfers conditional
on school attendance by the children
of beneficiary households and regular
health check-ups by all its members.
Its apolitical claims related to its transfer
and targeting mechanisms. Transfers
were sent directly from the programme
administration to recipients, without
intermediation through subnational
budgets. Targeting was carried out in three
steps. First, demographic data were used to
identify the most deprived communities.
Then, beneficiary households within these
communities were selected on the basis
of household surveys. Finally, the list of
selected households was reviewed in a
community meeting.
The innovative claims related to (i)
an integrated approach to poverty,
(ii) a positive gender bias, directing the
transfers to the mothers and granting
higher subsidies for female students,
and (iii) an emphasis on participation,
both in the targeting review process
and by including a beneficiary liaison. An
experimental evaluation was introduced
at the design stage, conducted by
independent and renowned researchers.
It provided evidence of positive impacts,
boosting international recognition.
In Brazil, relatively successful local
CCTs preceded the federal Bolsa Escola
programme, which was introduced in the
run-up to the general elections in 2002.
This might help explain why, in less than
one year, the programme managed to
reach more than five million households
around the country.
Bolsa Escola granted monthly transfers
to poor households with children aged
6-15, conditioned on school attendance.
Transfers amounted to a maximum
of US$ 15 per family (while in Mexico,
Progresa transfers could add up to US$ 60).
Decentralized fiscal arrangements, however,
allowed richer states and municipalities
to top up transfers or expand coverage.
For the selection of beneficiaries, the
government established a poverty line
and calculated estimates of the target
population based on demographic data.
This created a sort of quota for each
municipality, which was then in charge
of implementing targeting to households.
Why were CCTs chosen as the preferred
policy option? Governments could
have expanded and enhanced existing
education or health interventions with
the funding that was used to start up
CCTs. While this might seem easier than
designing whole new programmes, it
was likely to attract less attention to
focus only on the supply of regular
social sector services.
What about results? Initial evaluations
have shown positive effects of CCTs on




CCTs are trendy.  They
are both short-term social




Initial evaluations have shown
positive effects on schooling
and nutrition, but their
impact on poverty is
still not  clear.
CCTs can only work where





in Latin America16 United Nations Development Programme
regarding the impact on child labor is
not conclusive, since school attendance
can be frequently combined with work
and requires broader interventions.
The impact on poverty is still not so clear.
In the short run, the magnitude of effects
on poverty rates varies by programme.
In the long run, the translation of higher
educational attainment into higher
earnings cannot be taken for granted.
It depends on the quality of education,
rates of employment, absorption of skilled
labor in the economy and general rates
of return to education.
To understand why CCTs were replicated
across the region, we should bear in mind
not only their results, but also their fit
into the mainstream development
discourse. Elements such as gender, human
capital, participation, empowerment and
targeting are all included, to varying
degrees, in CCT programmes.
Politically, CCTs seem quite feasible.
Linking cash transfers to certain desirable
behaviours among the poor highlights
the co-responsibility of beneficiaries for
their own well-being and a move away
from paternalistic social assistance.
Also, CCTs relate to poor children’s present
living conditions and future opportunities.
They are seen as a way of helping the
‘deserving poor’ escape poverty, while also
boosting long-term economic growth.
Growing urban violence in Latin America
and a widespread notion that it is
associated with poverty might contribute
to the political feasibility of CCTs. Fear
might motivate elites favoring public
policies directed to address poverty and
keep poor children and teenagers in school
(and out of the streets). It is notable that
the successors of Progresa and Bolsa Escola,
which were initially more concentrated
in the poorest rural areas, were expanded
for considerable coverage of urban and
metropolitan areas.
In the particular case of Brazil, two other
elements should be noted. The successes
of local CCT programmes had been
widely disseminated by the media, which
contributed to an increasing degree
of support to this kind of intervention.
And the decentralized operation of Bolsa
Escola allowed municipalities to share the
credit for it and manage a crucial political
instrument: targeting beneficiaries at the
local level.
In principle, CCTs strived for the most
accurate targeting possible. From the start,
however, both programmes incurred in
undercoverage of poor households, as
Progresa did not serve communities
unattended by health and education
services and Bolsa Escola excluded families
without children in school and people
outside conventional households.
In practice, targeting was flawed. Although
Progresa’s methodology outperformed
other targeting methods, community
reviews did not take place as originally
envisioned, functioning more as
legitimizing instances for the previous
‘scientific’ steps of targeting. In Bolsa
Escola, there was significant room for
political patronage and leakage of
benefits, especially considering its
pace of implementation.
As Bolsa Escola’s targeting practices were
maintained by its successor, there have
been numerous accusations of deliberate
targeting errors. The initial view adopted
by the government was close to a basic
income approach. Targeting was not
considered a desirable element of the
programme, just a necessary mechanism
related to budget constraints. But public
opinion has repeatedly demanded tighter
procedures to screen potential beneficiaries,
indicating an implicit and unresolved
tension between two distinct notions of
the programme: as a basic universal right
or as a targeted response to a need.
CCTs entail considerable capability
requirements, especially in their initial
set-up. They involve relatively complex
targeting mechanisms and delivery
logistics besides the need of good
coordination with health and education
providers. As they expand, however, there
can be economies of scale, contributing
to keep overall administrative costs low.
Both Progresa and Bolsa Escola were
integrated into existing line ministries, as
regular government programmes. While this
might increase prospects of sustainability
and institutionalization, important
administrative challenges remain.
For instance, cost-effective mechanisms
for monitoring the compliance of
conditionalities, which are at the same time
timely and accurate, need to be designed.
Also, no clear formula seems to be in
Cash transfer programme challenges
1. Designing effective exit strategies – Strategic exit factors are (i) the adequate
utilisation of existing data for systematic identification of beneficiaries, and (ii) the
performance of the economy in creating employment and expanding the labour market.
2. Supporting households upon exiting the programme – Programme graduates need
other forms of support to ensure that they do not fall back into poverty when no longer
eligible for cash transfers.
3. Making programmes work both as safety nets and springboards – Cash transfers
and conditionalities do not affect structural poverty; it is necessary also to promote
access, supply and quality of services like education, health, vocational training and
micro-credits.
4. Expanding programme eligibility – Some poor people live outside narrowly defined
family households and age groups. Poverty impact would be greater if households
without children and elderly were included, as well as single persons.
5. Avoiding the dichotomy “targeting vs. universalism” – Targeting social protection is a
strategy for preparing the integration of poor and excluded people into full citizenship;
in highly unequal societies it is necessary to combine targeted and universal programmes.
6. Evaluations – It is necessary to evaluate programme outcomes and processes to learn
more about what works, what does not, and why. Evaluations are also useful for
enhancing cooperation, disseminating ideas, training agents, improving implementation
efficiency, prevent distortions, and for measuring impact. Moreover, evaluations are
persuasive tools for finance and planning and for informing the public political debate
on social inequality.
Ana Fonseca: Programas de Transferencia de Ingresos en una perspectiva
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place to determine the optimal amount
of transfers. In the same way, consistent
rules and procedures are needed for the
inclusion of new beneficiaries or for
‘graduation’ from the programmes.
Although these issues point to
administrative obstacles, they are
also connected to political economy
considerations. Recertification of
beneficiaries might create tensions with
current recipients, highlighting potential
conflicts between the counter-cyclical
nature of safety nets and a natural trend
of transfers to be perceived as permanent
entitlements. It can also lead to budgetary
redistributions across states, a sensitive
issue for federal governments.
CCTs have the advantage of tackling
several problems in a single policy.
Cash transfers entail less transaction costs
than in-kind transfers. And direct transfer
to the mothers might generate efficiency
gains and female empowerment. However,
CCTs can only be effective where no
supply biases and geographic barriers
exist; they can only be complements
to broader social provisioning, never
substitutes. They can only work where
social services exist and are delivered
with an acceptable level of quality.
A crucial question is the need for
conditionalities in the first place. The
assumption that poor households would
not automatically choose to invest in
human capital cannot be taken for
granted. Would the same impact not be
obtained through unconditional transfers
combined with significant improvements
in the delivery of social services? While
this question may well be adequate,
political and administrative feasibility
might help explain the inclusion of
conditionalities in their design; introducing
a new programme, even if complex, might
still be easier than reforming existing ones.
International leverage appears to have
had a smaller role in the original creation
of CCTs than previous social safety nets
in Latin America. The design of Progresa
and Bolsa Escola was home-grown
and international funding was only
introduced later. However, international
leverage seems to be the key factor
explaining the replication of these
initiatives in other countries in a
relatively short time span.
If the innovative characteristics of CCTs
matched many of the concerns of the
international agenda on poverty, their
visibility to donors was enhanced by
scientifically ‘proven’ results made
possible by the experimental evaluation
of Progresa. This visibility, in turn, accounts
for the popularity of CCTs, as additional
loans and funds are made available for
governments willing to implement them.
Moreover, it is translated in considerable
efforts of dissemination, as donor agencies
increasingly act as intermediaries for the
diffusion of ‘best practices’ among
developing countries.
This illustrates how international
organizations shape the discourse
and practice of social policy around the
developing world, but it does not lead to
a clear-cut conclusion that governments
have no room for maneuver. The home-
grown experiences of Progresa and Bolsa
Escola show how this can also work the
other way around: they were national
ideas ‘bought’ by donors and ‘sold’ as
innovative solutions elsewhere.
As much as CCTs might have an important
role in poverty reduction, there are limits
to what they can achieve. Low levels of
human capital are a central reason for
the low incomes of the poor in Latin
America, but this is only one part of the
story. Complementary macroeconomic
policies, which balance social protection
and macroeconomic stabilization, are
essential as well as interventions to
alter deeply rooted and reproduced
inequalities, fostering the accumulation
of other assets by the poor.
The increasing prominence of CCTs should
be regarded with caution. They can be a
step forward from conventional safety nets
in the direction of ‘enabling springboards’
or win-win alternatives for donors and
recipients. But they cannot do it all.
Tatiana Britto: Recent trends in the
development agenda of Latin America:
an analysis of conditional cash transfers.
<http://www.eldis.org/cf/search/disp/
docdisplay.cfm?doc=DOC17797&resource=f1>
Chile Solidario: A new paradigm for social protection in Latin America
The Chile Solidario programme aims to eradicate extreme poverty that is persisting
in 250,000 households, despite 20 years of fast and sustained economic growth and a
strong focus on poverty reduction by the democratic governments since 1990. Previous
programmes were segmented along sectoral divides resulting in large efficiency losses,
and policy design was ineffective due to insufficient understanding of (i) the multiple causes
of poverty, and (ii) the role of households in social protection. They focused on individuals,
assuming a stable, male breadwinner. Chile Solidario since 2002 provides comprehensive
support for households trying to overcome extreme and persistent poverty, and includes
means for strengthening the agency of the poor.
Chile Solidario is novel in several ways:
 Local councils select and approach extremely poor households based on information
from a questionnaire about housing, education, employment and assets.
 It has authority to break with sectoral segmentation and enforce integrated
implementation among the public entities involved, supported by a modified budget
management system.
 There are supporting subsystems providing social information and and advanced impact
evaluation of this and related social programmes.
 Cash transfers for water supply, children’s schooling, and basic pensions are permanent,
while others are limited to two or five years, depending on social workers’ assessment.
Chile Solidario is not yet an established form of social action, only a first attempt to
construct a comprehensive social protection system, which should include all those
facing social risk, not just those living in chronic poverty. Also, a geographical approach
should be included; social risks are directly related to local environments.
Santibáñez, C.: The Informational Basis of Poverty Measurement: Using the Capability
Approach to Improve the CAS Proxy Tool.  European Journal of Development Research,
2005, 17/1: 89-110.18 United Nations Development Programme 18 United Nations Development Programme
INSIGHT
by Timo Voipio, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, and
Chair, DAC/POVNET Task Team on Social Protection and Social Policy
Social Protection
for Pro-Poor Growth
The Development Assistance Committee, DAC, of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, is a forum for enhancing donor policies
and programmes in developing countries. Its Poverty Network (POVNET) drafted the DAC
Poverty Reduction Guidelines (2001), promoting the multi-dimensionality of poverty,
context-specific approaches and coherence across all OECD country policies.
Recent POVNET work has focused on the theme Pro-Poor Growth – how to make GDP
growth more effective in reducing multi-dimensional poverty. Growth is often seen
only in a few sectors and regions while most poor women and men are neither
participating in, contributing to nor benefiting from growth; then something is wrong
with the pattern of growth.
One of the major challenges emerging from this work concerned risks and vulnerability.
The contributions of poor women and men to GDP growth are constrained by their
inability to manage the risks and vulnerabilities of engaging in markets. Poor households
often engage in low-productivity activities, because they are less risky than potentially
high-productivity alternatives. Hence, reducing the risks faced by poor people through
reliable social protection instruments can help to increase productivity and stimulate
growth by encouraging people to engage in higher risk/higher yield activities. Reducing
risks also means that poor people do not have to fall back on coping strategies that
can lead to long-term poverty traps, such as selling their assets or depriving their
children of food, schooling and health services.
At the initiative of Finland, Germany and the UK, the POVNET has organised a Task
Team on Risk, Vulnerability and Social Protection. Other members came from France,
Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and USA. Of the multilateral
agencies, UNDP, ILO, WFP, World Bank and UNICEF have participated actively. The task
of this team is to draft DAC Guidelines on social protection and related broader social
policy aspects by the year 2008.
In the first phase of work the Task Team concentrated on making contributions to the
POVNET’s main output of work, the overarching paper Promoting Pro-poor Growth: Policy
Guidance for Donors. After a lot of dialogue and negotiation between the advocates
of the more economistic way of thinking and those supporting a more social approach,
a compromise language was found that satisfied both.
The key message of the POVNET overarching paper was phrased as follows: “Rapid and
sustained poverty reduction requires pro-poor growth, i.e. a pace and pattern of growth that enhances
the ability of poor women and men to participate in, contribute to and benefit from growth.”
Developing countries with similar rates of economic growth have experienced quite
different levels of poverty reduction, due to initial conditions and whether growth occurs
in areas and sectors where the poor live and are economically active. Policies often need
to create the conditions and remove the obstacles to the participation of poor women
and men in the growth process, e.g. by increasing access to land, labour and capital
markets and by investing in basic social services, social protection and infrastructure.
Inequality of assets and opportunity hinders the ability of poor people to participate
in and contribute to growth. High and rising levels of income inequality lower the
Reducing the economic
vulnerability of poor women
and men has a triple pay-off:
Enhanced human security,
faster economic growth and
a pro-poor pattern of growth.
DAC donors are working on it.
Source: Pro-poor Growth in the 1990s.
Operationalization Pro-poor Growth Research
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poverty reduction impact of a given rate of growth and can reduce the political
stability and social cohesion needed for sustainable growth. Gender is a particularly
important dimension of inequality. Women face particular barriers concerning assets,
access and participation in the growth process, with serious implications for the ability
of growth to be pro-poor. The growth experience shows that rising inequality is not an
inevitable consequence of the growth process, as long as there is a mix of policies that
addresses both growth and distributional objectives, strengthens empowerment and
deals with gender and other biases (e.g. race, caste, disability, religion).
In addition to the intrinsic value of greater human security, increasing the economic
security of the poor pays the double dividend of helping to sustain faster economic
growth and bringing about a pro-poor pattern of growth. Taking advantage of
opportunities requires taking risk – producing new crops, entrepreneurship, moving to new
areas and jobs all involve risk. With their meagre incomes, the poor are especially vulnerable
to the potential consequences of risk taking and are hence reluctant to take on additional
risk. Prevention, mitigating and coping strategies that reduce vulnerability to risk are thus
important for pro-poor growth; they involve actions towards increasing the reliability
of agricultural production and incomes, deepening insurance markets through public-
private arrangements so that they reach the poor, and ensuring credible social protection.
Policies that provide greater incentive to combine pro-poor growth with sustainable use
of natural resources often contribute to reducing the vulnerability of the poor.
There has been a stark dichotomy between development approaches concerned with the
productive sectors, usually focusing on enhancing the supply of goods and services,
and those concerned with social protection, which have been widely regarded as a
drain on public resources. A background paper for the POVNET Risk and Vulnerability
Task Team argues that the two are complementary: as well as providing safety nets,
social protection reduces vulnerability to risk and so facilitates engagement by the
poor in more productive enterprises; they also reduce the dangers of an outflow of
capital from productive activities to meet domestic shocks and stresses.
Recent experience suggests an important role for cash transfers in both development and
rehabilitation contexts. Different types of cash transfer could be complementary to each
other as well as to “in-kind” and other forms of transfer, and to wider public investment.
By allowing people to exercise choice, they switch emphasis from the supply to the
demand side, at a single stroke increasing local demand for food and other products, and
reducing the disruption to local markets that transfers in kind may cause. Preconditions for
success in cash schemes include: government commitment to reducing poverty: long-term
availability of funds either from taxation or from donor resources; simple, transparent
targeting criteria; automatic and robust delivery mechanisms and transparency regarding
people’s entitlements, so that people become aware of, and may exercise, their rights.
Conditionality might also be appropriate but will depend on the objectives of the cash
transfer and will need to be judged on a case by case basis. In this way, cash transfers
are likely to be less costly to administer, no more prone to corruption than other types
of transfer, and potentially cost-effective reducing certain types of poverty in certain
contexts. They are not a panacea, however: they will complement (and have to be
complemented by) other instruments, and policy will still have to remove social, market
and administrative discrimination against the poor if they are to engage more fully in
growth processes.
In the next phase of work the POVNET Task Team on Social Protection and Social Policy
will discuss these initial ideas with development partners in the Global South.
Interaction will take place in developing countries with donor offices and government
departments, partly on a bilateral basis and partly coordinated and harmonised
between several donor agencies.  
Farrington J., Harvey P. and Slater R.: Cash transfers in the context of pro-poor growth.
Background paper for OECD/DAC POVNET Risk and Vulnerability Task Team, 2005.
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/58/36570713.pdf>
Source: Kakwani, N. and Subbarao, K.:
Ageing and Poverty in Africa and the Role of
Social Pensions, UNDP International Poverty
Centre, Working Paper No. 8, August 2005.International Poverty Centre
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